Have you ever seen a stranger smile and smiled yourself? I have, and you almost certainly have too – unless you have something like a cleft lip deformity.
We all are influenced, more or less, by what others around us say and do. If someone does something it makes it much easier for others to copy or reciprocate. You may want to smile/dance/sing etc and someone else doing that makes the whole thing much easier.
The people that I really like are those who do not care about what others think, in a positive way (more on this later dudes), who have bubbly personalities, smile and are warm. Why? Because I want to be friendly, I want to smile and I want to have a connection with other people. I want to be authentic and true to myself. Being around other people who embody this make the whole process much easier (and fun!).
My point is this: those who live authentically, wholly, with warmth and love give a great gift to everyone else – ie they make it easier to do the same.
I ran a project called smile a day – where I tried to do something new everyday to help others (and get at the very least a metaphorical smile). I had fun doing it and learned some cool stuff. One thing I learned relates to this: if you want to be kind there is no need necessarily do extra things for others, one of the greatest gifts we can give others is to do with how we relate to them and the example we set them.
Saturday, 16 May 2009
Friday, 3 April 2009
The Four Noble Truths
1) Life is suffering
Suffering (both physical and mental) is an intrinsic part of life. Just as birth, sickness, old age and death are inevitable parts of life. The good times never last for everything is impermanent, and sooner or later the good times will become boring or end. Life is intrinsically imperfect because everything is in constant flux.
Suffering is called dukkha which is better translated as unsatisfactoriness. What this truth has in mind is the frustration, pain and disappointment that comes with not getting what you wanted or not having your expectations met.
Suffering (both physical and mental) is an intrinsic part of life. Just as birth, sickness, old age and death are inevitable parts of life. The good times never last for everything is impermanent, and sooner or later the good times will become boring or end. Life is intrinsically imperfect because everything is in constant flux.
Suffering is called dukkha which is better translated as unsatisfactoriness. What this truth has in mind is the frustration, pain and disappointment that comes with not getting what you wanted or not having your expectations met.
Saturday, 28 March 2009
Identity: a collection of perspectives
Here's a collection of perspectives on identity, all of which I think are right.
Overcoming Bias:
Identity gets in the way of reason. If our identity is tied to certain beliefs then we suspend reason when we think/read material that support our beliefs and are overly critical/dismissive when we come across challenging material. There was an experiment that supports this claim (I can't recall the authors' names or the source though): participants were asked to assess evidence that supported and undermined the death penalty and there was a clear correlation between the participant's beliefs about the death penalty and their assessments of the different data.
Several things can be taken from this idea. Firstly, we should recognize we have a predisposition to make charitable judgements of things we like and harsh judgements of things we don't. If we care about reasoning properly this is something that one needs to compensate for (perhaps by consciously seeking positives in challenging material - this is called the Principle of Charity - and seeking negatives in supporting material).
Secondly, we should detach our beliefs from our identity so to help one reason better. Otherwise we'll have an emotional reaction to attacks on one's beliefs. We'll interpret them as attacks on us which prevents critical, mutually beneficial dialogue. We need to be able to realize that an attack on a set of beliefs is not an attack on us. This poses a big problem, however, for fundamental beliefs. For example, a Christian might say that well even if this is right that aligning our identity with our beliefs makes it more difficult to reason well this is cannot be helped: their belief that Jesus is the son of God is so fundamental that it is inescapably part of their identity. They see themselves as first and foremost children of God.
So here we are lead to a deeper question: is it desirable to separate our beliefs from our identity (assuming that it is possible)? On one hand, we can claim that reasoning well is a positive value because good reasoning leads to better policy and helps us to make better decisions. On the other hand, we can claim that a certain belief is definitely correct (say the existence of the Christian God). To such a claim I would reply, that first most important things cannot be known for certain (and we could plausibly say that nothing can be known for certain). [I can think of several other arguments such as psychological benefits etc. They all seem post hoc rationalizations of an emotional dislike of being wrong or having beliefs we are attached to undermined or criticized.]
As for whether this is possible, I'm not sure as I don't personally believe in anything like the Christian God. To my mind though I think it is possible for people to believe in God without considering that their belief in God is part of who they are. Maybe that's wrong - I hope not.
This leads to a third point: if you want to persuade somebody of something you might want to help them become better reasoners first (and lead by example by being willing to publicly change your own mind). There is no point reasoning with the fundamental Christian if they are poor reasoners and emotionally reject what you say. It's a waste of your time. As a psychological side-note, there is an idea of reciprocity: if you publicly agree with something they say they are more likely to publicly agree with something you say.
Fourthly, if we are going to choose an identity (let's assume we can do this) then perhaps we should see ourselves as sceptics - people who question and follow where reason takes them. Such beliefs about our identities (which is not the same as beliefs that are part of our identity; the first is active the second is passive) can be self-fulfilling.
Dirt Simple:
Our beliefs about our identities are self-fulfilling prophecies (this links up to the fourth claim above). One of the best ways to change our behaviour (if we want to) is to change our beliefs. Want to stop smoking? Believe you are a non-smoker; want to be confident? Believe that you are confident. I think there is at the least some truth in this - beliefs do often have a self-fulfilling impact. However, this view may be incomplete.
Non-violent Communication:
If we communicate labels and identities to others (e.g. 'you are lazy') this encourages self-fulfilling behaviour. This can apply to positive labels too (e.g. ' you are a good girl'), and negative, neutral and positive labels can all have harmful effects. They encourage certain behaviour irrespective of what the label-holder really wants to do and it prevents them connecting with their own needs and feelings. E.g. if someone thinks they are 'good' they might do things that make others perceive them as 'good' at the expense of their own well being.
Moreover, using labels in our communication prevents empathy and connection. If we judge people (e.g. 'you are lazy and irresponsible') people get defensive and it is harder for you to empathize with them and for them to understand your perspective or want to comply with your request.
Sometime soon I'll write about the Buddhist view of non-self, and add that to this list of perspectives on identity. This is probably the most important perspective of them all - and it suggests that the tactic of choosing useful labels and identities in order to achieve desirable ends (like being confident or being a good reasoner) can distract from the path to self-realization.
Overcoming Bias:
Identity gets in the way of reason. If our identity is tied to certain beliefs then we suspend reason when we think/read material that support our beliefs and are overly critical/dismissive when we come across challenging material. There was an experiment that supports this claim (I can't recall the authors' names or the source though): participants were asked to assess evidence that supported and undermined the death penalty and there was a clear correlation between the participant's beliefs about the death penalty and their assessments of the different data.
Several things can be taken from this idea. Firstly, we should recognize we have a predisposition to make charitable judgements of things we like and harsh judgements of things we don't. If we care about reasoning properly this is something that one needs to compensate for (perhaps by consciously seeking positives in challenging material - this is called the Principle of Charity - and seeking negatives in supporting material).
Secondly, we should detach our beliefs from our identity so to help one reason better. Otherwise we'll have an emotional reaction to attacks on one's beliefs. We'll interpret them as attacks on us which prevents critical, mutually beneficial dialogue. We need to be able to realize that an attack on a set of beliefs is not an attack on us. This poses a big problem, however, for fundamental beliefs. For example, a Christian might say that well even if this is right that aligning our identity with our beliefs makes it more difficult to reason well this is cannot be helped: their belief that Jesus is the son of God is so fundamental that it is inescapably part of their identity. They see themselves as first and foremost children of God.
So here we are lead to a deeper question: is it desirable to separate our beliefs from our identity (assuming that it is possible)? On one hand, we can claim that reasoning well is a positive value because good reasoning leads to better policy and helps us to make better decisions. On the other hand, we can claim that a certain belief is definitely correct (say the existence of the Christian God). To such a claim I would reply, that first most important things cannot be known for certain (and we could plausibly say that nothing can be known for certain). [I can think of several other arguments such as psychological benefits etc. They all seem post hoc rationalizations of an emotional dislike of being wrong or having beliefs we are attached to undermined or criticized.]
As for whether this is possible, I'm not sure as I don't personally believe in anything like the Christian God. To my mind though I think it is possible for people to believe in God without considering that their belief in God is part of who they are. Maybe that's wrong - I hope not.
This leads to a third point: if you want to persuade somebody of something you might want to help them become better reasoners first (and lead by example by being willing to publicly change your own mind). There is no point reasoning with the fundamental Christian if they are poor reasoners and emotionally reject what you say. It's a waste of your time. As a psychological side-note, there is an idea of reciprocity: if you publicly agree with something they say they are more likely to publicly agree with something you say.
Fourthly, if we are going to choose an identity (let's assume we can do this) then perhaps we should see ourselves as sceptics - people who question and follow where reason takes them. Such beliefs about our identities (which is not the same as beliefs that are part of our identity; the first is active the second is passive) can be self-fulfilling.
Dirt Simple:
Our beliefs about our identities are self-fulfilling prophecies (this links up to the fourth claim above). One of the best ways to change our behaviour (if we want to) is to change our beliefs. Want to stop smoking? Believe you are a non-smoker; want to be confident? Believe that you are confident. I think there is at the least some truth in this - beliefs do often have a self-fulfilling impact. However, this view may be incomplete.
Non-violent Communication:
If we communicate labels and identities to others (e.g. 'you are lazy') this encourages self-fulfilling behaviour. This can apply to positive labels too (e.g. ' you are a good girl'), and negative, neutral and positive labels can all have harmful effects. They encourage certain behaviour irrespective of what the label-holder really wants to do and it prevents them connecting with their own needs and feelings. E.g. if someone thinks they are 'good' they might do things that make others perceive them as 'good' at the expense of their own well being.
Moreover, using labels in our communication prevents empathy and connection. If we judge people (e.g. 'you are lazy and irresponsible') people get defensive and it is harder for you to empathize with them and for them to understand your perspective or want to comply with your request.
Sometime soon I'll write about the Buddhist view of non-self, and add that to this list of perspectives on identity. This is probably the most important perspective of them all - and it suggests that the tactic of choosing useful labels and identities in order to achieve desirable ends (like being confident or being a good reasoner) can distract from the path to self-realization.
Cuban Missile Crisis: on the edge
How close the Cuban Missile Crisis came to conflict (see: http://ocw.mit.edu/NR/rdonlyres/Political-Science/17-40Fall-2004/B97EBEC8-1631-4EFD-9F93-9D61E2EC02AB/0/17_40_lec19_cmc.pdf)
I'm assuming some basic familiarity with the crisis here: see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_missile_crisis
Inaccurate Perceptions:
1. JFK didn't expect USSR missile deployment to Cuba. That's why he warned publicly against it--he thought his bluff wouldn't be called.
2. US policymakers didn't see a chief USSR motive for deployment (defend Cuba from invasion); hence they nearly overlooked the no-invasion pledge as a solution to the crisis.
3. Khrushchev didn't expect U.S. detection of his missile deployment.
4. US leaders wrongly assumed Khrushchev ordered the Oct. 27 U2 shootdown.
5. US leaders underestimated Soviet and Cuban military capabilities in Cuba
a. The US thought the Soviets had 8,000-10,000 troops in Cuba; in fact they had 43,000 troops. Cuba had another 270,000 well-trained troops. The US planned to invade with only 140,000 troops. Sounds like a tough war for the USA!
b. More interestingly, the US was unaware that the Soviets had roughly 100 Soviet tactical warheads and means to deliver them in Cuba. (US leaders did correctly believe the Soviets probably had some IRBM warheads in Cuba although they lacked hard information on this.)
6. Castro was unaware of US nuclear superiority. Also, Castro thought that the US was bent on invading Cuba. So ... he urged the Soviet Union to forestall this US invasion with nuclear strikes!
7. JFK was unaware of symmetry of Soviet and US missile deployments. JFK: "It's just as if we suddenly began to put a major number of MRBMs in Turkey. Now that'd be goddam
dangerous, I would think." Bundy and Alexis Johnson then explain "Well, we did, Mr. President."
How tight was central control on military operations? Not very!
1. The Oct. 27 Soviet shootdown of the U.S. U2 was unauthorized by Moscow.
2. US anti-submarine operations were more aggressive than JFK knew. Indeed, they were more aggressive and dangerous than the U.S. Navy itself knew. On Oct. 27 the Navy forced to the surface a Soviet submarine that, unbeknownst to the Navy, carried a nuclear torpedo and was commanded by a Soviet officer that feared he was under attack and had briefly considered arming his nuclear torpedoes.
3. A U.S. U2 strayed over Siberia during the crisis. The Soviets could have thought this a precursor to a U.S. first strike.
4. US test intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were armed with nuclear warheads during the crisis; and a scheduled test from this test-field was still conducted.
5. A U.S. intelligence ship remained close to Cuba early in the crisis--an inviting target.
6. A pre-planned retaliatory strike was nearly conducted after the U2 shootdown--another near-oversight.
What if someone else had been President? JFK was markedly more dovish than other U.S. policymakers. Had he not been President history probably would have been different and more exciting. The military favored war, Acheson favored war. [And his advisers favored war.]
In sum, the Americans and Russians almost blundered into a conflict. What is telling about this narrative is how mistakes, lack of control, lack of dialogue, psychological biases and inaccurate perceptions makes brinkmanship very dangerous. This suggests that the story that the MAD (mutually assured destruction) strategy prevented nuclear conflict during the Cold War is misleading: there was almost conflict despite MAD.
I'm assuming some basic familiarity with the crisis here: see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_missile_crisis
Inaccurate Perceptions:
1. JFK didn't expect USSR missile deployment to Cuba. That's why he warned publicly against it--he thought his bluff wouldn't be called.
2. US policymakers didn't see a chief USSR motive for deployment (defend Cuba from invasion); hence they nearly overlooked the no-invasion pledge as a solution to the crisis.
3. Khrushchev didn't expect U.S. detection of his missile deployment.
4. US leaders wrongly assumed Khrushchev ordered the Oct. 27 U2 shootdown.
5. US leaders underestimated Soviet and Cuban military capabilities in Cuba
a. The US thought the Soviets had 8,000-10,000 troops in Cuba; in fact they had 43,000 troops. Cuba had another 270,000 well-trained troops. The US planned to invade with only 140,000 troops. Sounds like a tough war for the USA!
b. More interestingly, the US was unaware that the Soviets had roughly 100 Soviet tactical warheads and means to deliver them in Cuba. (US leaders did correctly believe the Soviets probably had some IRBM warheads in Cuba although they lacked hard information on this.)
6. Castro was unaware of US nuclear superiority. Also, Castro thought that the US was bent on invading Cuba. So ... he urged the Soviet Union to forestall this US invasion with nuclear strikes!
7. JFK was unaware of symmetry of Soviet and US missile deployments. JFK: "It's just as if we suddenly began to put a major number of MRBMs in Turkey. Now that'd be goddam
dangerous, I would think." Bundy and Alexis Johnson then explain "Well, we did, Mr. President."
How tight was central control on military operations? Not very!
1. The Oct. 27 Soviet shootdown of the U.S. U2 was unauthorized by Moscow.
2. US anti-submarine operations were more aggressive than JFK knew. Indeed, they were more aggressive and dangerous than the U.S. Navy itself knew. On Oct. 27 the Navy forced to the surface a Soviet submarine that, unbeknownst to the Navy, carried a nuclear torpedo and was commanded by a Soviet officer that feared he was under attack and had briefly considered arming his nuclear torpedoes.
3. A U.S. U2 strayed over Siberia during the crisis. The Soviets could have thought this a precursor to a U.S. first strike.
4. US test intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were armed with nuclear warheads during the crisis; and a scheduled test from this test-field was still conducted.
5. A U.S. intelligence ship remained close to Cuba early in the crisis--an inviting target.
6. A pre-planned retaliatory strike was nearly conducted after the U2 shootdown--another near-oversight.
What if someone else had been President? JFK was markedly more dovish than other U.S. policymakers. Had he not been President history probably would have been different and more exciting. The military favored war, Acheson favored war. [And his advisers favored war.]
In sum, the Americans and Russians almost blundered into a conflict. What is telling about this narrative is how mistakes, lack of control, lack of dialogue, psychological biases and inaccurate perceptions makes brinkmanship very dangerous. This suggests that the story that the MAD (mutually assured destruction) strategy prevented nuclear conflict during the Cold War is misleading: there was almost conflict despite MAD.
Friday, 27 March 2009
The Ontological Argument Shot Down
There is a family of arguments that claim to prove the existence of God from the definition of God. They are called the Ontological argument.
I realised today that my rebutal of this argument dating from my A Level studies doesn't actually work, so I did some thinking and think I've managed to pinpoint the problem with this family of arguments.
The basic structure of the Ontological argument (loosely following Anselm's version) goes like this:
1) God is the Greatest Being possible.
2) If something exists it is greater than something which does not.
3) Therefore God exists.
For the sake of the argument let us assume that premise 1) and 2) are correct, for I don't need to refute these claims to show the Ontological argument fails.
I'm going to elaborate on 1)-2) so we can see why the conclusion 3) does not follow.
In premise 1) we are claiming that God, if He exists, is the greatest being possible. This is making a definitional claim. It is equivalent to saying that a bachelor is a unmaried man.
In premise 2) we are claiming that existence makes something greater. Now the correct conclusion to draw from these two premises is this:
4) In order for God to be the Greatest Being possible He must exist.
This conclusion remains in the definitional realm: we are simply claiming that a certain condition needs to be met in order for God to be the Greatest Being possible.
So we'll end up with a list of features that God must have in order to be the Greatest Being possible. Heres the crucial bit: it does not follow from 4) ['In order for God to be the Greatest Being possible He must exist'] conclusion 3) that God exists.
Conclusion 4) is a definitional claim which is saying that God is not the Greatest Being possible unless he exists. This is compatible with the claim that God does not exist. For if God does not exist then we simply conclude that God is not the Greatest Being possible!
In other words, we cannot logically move from the definition of God to the existence of God. Let me restate the crucial point: the claim that 'in order for God to be the Greatest Being possible He must exist' is COMPATIBLE with the premise 'God does not exist'. If that was the case we would simply conclude that God is not the Greatest Being possible.
So we don't need to look at philosophical claims about whether existence is a predicate (a quality) or not, or how the word 'is' is being conflated in the presentation of the argument or any other complicated argument designed to prove that the Ontological argument is wrong. The Ontological argument does not work simply because premises 1) and 2) only support conclusion 4) 'In order for God to be the Greatest Being possible He must exist'. Premise 4) is compatible with either God existing or not existing - i.e. we cannot conclude anything from 4) relating to God's existence.
Does that make sense?
I realised today that my rebutal of this argument dating from my A Level studies doesn't actually work, so I did some thinking and think I've managed to pinpoint the problem with this family of arguments.
The basic structure of the Ontological argument (loosely following Anselm's version) goes like this:
1) God is the Greatest Being possible.
2) If something exists it is greater than something which does not.
3) Therefore God exists.
For the sake of the argument let us assume that premise 1) and 2) are correct, for I don't need to refute these claims to show the Ontological argument fails.
I'm going to elaborate on 1)-2) so we can see why the conclusion 3) does not follow.
In premise 1) we are claiming that God, if He exists, is the greatest being possible. This is making a definitional claim. It is equivalent to saying that a bachelor is a unmaried man.
In premise 2) we are claiming that existence makes something greater. Now the correct conclusion to draw from these two premises is this:
4) In order for God to be the Greatest Being possible He must exist.
This conclusion remains in the definitional realm: we are simply claiming that a certain condition needs to be met in order for God to be the Greatest Being possible.
So we'll end up with a list of features that God must have in order to be the Greatest Being possible. Heres the crucial bit: it does not follow from 4) ['In order for God to be the Greatest Being possible He must exist'] conclusion 3) that God exists.
Conclusion 4) is a definitional claim which is saying that God is not the Greatest Being possible unless he exists. This is compatible with the claim that God does not exist. For if God does not exist then we simply conclude that God is not the Greatest Being possible!
In other words, we cannot logically move from the definition of God to the existence of God. Let me restate the crucial point: the claim that 'in order for God to be the Greatest Being possible He must exist' is COMPATIBLE with the premise 'God does not exist'. If that was the case we would simply conclude that God is not the Greatest Being possible.
So we don't need to look at philosophical claims about whether existence is a predicate (a quality) or not, or how the word 'is' is being conflated in the presentation of the argument or any other complicated argument designed to prove that the Ontological argument is wrong. The Ontological argument does not work simply because premises 1) and 2) only support conclusion 4) 'In order for God to be the Greatest Being possible He must exist'. Premise 4) is compatible with either God existing or not existing - i.e. we cannot conclude anything from 4) relating to God's existence.
Does that make sense?
Saturday, 21 March 2009
Ethics and obligations
I've finally got my thoughts about the existence and nature of good/evil sorted out.
I've been telling people for some time that I don't believe in good or evil and that we have no moral obligations. I've realised that this was for two reasons:
1) I'm sceptical of talk of duty and obligations because I am sensitive to the danger that such ideas can used to manipulate and control other people's actions. [E.g. you are obliged to fight for your country. You have a duty to respect your elders and do what they tell you to do.]
2) I want to keep personal judgements out of interpersonal relationships as I believe judging hinders empathy and communication.
3) A lot of people use the concepts good and evil as a way of dressing up their emotional intuitions and to create a dichotomy between 'us' and 'them'.
I've realised, however, that these concerns do not mean that the concepts good, evil and moral obligation should be rejected.
What is Good is what we should ethically do, and what is evil is what we should ethically refrain from. To see things ethically is, as Singer points out, to see things from the universe's perspective. It is to look at matters dispassionately, without adding extra weight to one's own interests simply because they are our own intersts.
Now if we accept a secular view of ethics then ethics is not objective (i.e. there is no set of objective moral facts). Rather ethics is subjective - but this does not mean that each view is as good as each other. Some views of what ethics requires are better supported by reason than others.
A moral obligation is what ethics requires us to do. Now although talk of morality has been used to refer to self-interest and been used as a way to control others this does not mean that is what ethics is. Ethics, done properly (which is difficult!), is a set of prescriptions based upon reason where our interests are not given extra (or less) weight purely because they are our interests.
Moreover, I think you can have a view about what is right and wrong action without thinking that right or wrong action makes the actor good or bad (perhaps its genes/environment; what if they sincerely believe that that is what ethics demands of them?; or we can refrain from making this jump on instrumental grounds - e.g. it hinders empathy and communication).
The really interesting question here is why be ethical? Why should we carry out our moral obligations? Here are three possible reasons:
1) Because it overlaps with our immediate self-interest. [But we acting self-interestedly not ethically.]
2) There is no objective meaning of life - we give life meaning. One possible meaning of life we can give it is to live ethically.
3) Living ethically meets our fundamental needs for love, compassion and empathy. [This is a deeper version of 1)]
I think all three together provide reason to do ethical actions: because we would do them anyway; because it is a source of purpose and meaning; and because living in such a way meets our core needs and helps us flourish as human beings.
I've been telling people for some time that I don't believe in good or evil and that we have no moral obligations. I've realised that this was for two reasons:
1) I'm sceptical of talk of duty and obligations because I am sensitive to the danger that such ideas can used to manipulate and control other people's actions. [E.g. you are obliged to fight for your country. You have a duty to respect your elders and do what they tell you to do.]
2) I want to keep personal judgements out of interpersonal relationships as I believe judging hinders empathy and communication.
3) A lot of people use the concepts good and evil as a way of dressing up their emotional intuitions and to create a dichotomy between 'us' and 'them'.
I've realised, however, that these concerns do not mean that the concepts good, evil and moral obligation should be rejected.
What is Good is what we should ethically do, and what is evil is what we should ethically refrain from. To see things ethically is, as Singer points out, to see things from the universe's perspective. It is to look at matters dispassionately, without adding extra weight to one's own interests simply because they are our own intersts.
Now if we accept a secular view of ethics then ethics is not objective (i.e. there is no set of objective moral facts). Rather ethics is subjective - but this does not mean that each view is as good as each other. Some views of what ethics requires are better supported by reason than others.
A moral obligation is what ethics requires us to do. Now although talk of morality has been used to refer to self-interest and been used as a way to control others this does not mean that is what ethics is. Ethics, done properly (which is difficult!), is a set of prescriptions based upon reason where our interests are not given extra (or less) weight purely because they are our interests.
Moreover, I think you can have a view about what is right and wrong action without thinking that right or wrong action makes the actor good or bad (perhaps its genes/environment; what if they sincerely believe that that is what ethics demands of them?; or we can refrain from making this jump on instrumental grounds - e.g. it hinders empathy and communication).
The really interesting question here is why be ethical? Why should we carry out our moral obligations? Here are three possible reasons:
1) Because it overlaps with our immediate self-interest. [But we acting self-interestedly not ethically.]
2) There is no objective meaning of life - we give life meaning. One possible meaning of life we can give it is to live ethically.
3) Living ethically meets our fundamental needs for love, compassion and empathy. [This is a deeper version of 1)]
I think all three together provide reason to do ethical actions: because we would do them anyway; because it is a source of purpose and meaning; and because living in such a way meets our core needs and helps us flourish as human beings.
Monday, 2 February 2009
Baptism Poem
Here's a super poem, that put a smile on my face:
Baptism
A caterpillar is he who stumbles
Into that sanctuary
To be molded and mended while reason sleeps
And awake to find himself different, quite different
Than when he entered
Beauty now supercedes his previous countenance
For he is a creature of divine spirit now
Transformed by holy glory
Saved and repented of his ugly past
Angel's wings he bears
To flutter here to there
Among the heavenly flowers
Of his new inhabitance
Only to be snatched up
And eaten by an abominable frog
Darrell Orrell
Baptism
A caterpillar is he who stumbles
Into that sanctuary
To be molded and mended while reason sleeps
And awake to find himself different, quite different
Than when he entered
Beauty now supercedes his previous countenance
For he is a creature of divine spirit now
Transformed by holy glory
Saved and repented of his ugly past
Angel's wings he bears
To flutter here to there
Among the heavenly flowers
Of his new inhabitance
Only to be snatched up
And eaten by an abominable frog
Darrell Orrell
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